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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 1995, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 through 415 became law.2
These new rules were designed to provide a more liberal framework for the
1J.D. expected 1997, University of California Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
Philosophy, Yale University. Clerk to the Honorable Stephen S. Trott of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1997-98. Dedicated to my mother who showed
me that curiosity is always rewarding.
2Federal Rule 413 reads, in pertinent part:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible,
and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence
under this rule, the attorney for the Government shall disclose the
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admission of evidence of a defendant's prior act or acts of sexual violence or
child molestation.3 The rules create an evidentiary presumption that evidence
of prior sexual assault or child molestation is admissible in sexual assault or
molestation cases. 4
The new amendments to the evidentiary rules were first proposed in 1991
during the Bush administration and were flatly rejected. 5 These revisions,
however, were again proposed 6 as part of the Violent Crime Control and
Enforcement Act, enacted on September 13, 1994.7 Proponents of the revisions
claim that they satisfy profound needs in the American system of criminal
justice.8 Those who have written in protest of the passage of the new
amendments argue that the revisions potentially jeopardize fundamental
liberties and directly conflict with the philosophy from which the rest of the
Federal Rules of Evidence derive their legitimacy.9
evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a
summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be
offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at
such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or
consideration of evidence under any other rule. FED. R. EVID. 413
(West 1995).
Federal Rule 414 extends the same provisions for the admission of evidence in cases in
which child molestation has been charged. See FED. R. EvID. 414 (West 1995).
Federal Rule 415 covers civil cases "in which a claim for damages or other relief is
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual
assault or child molestation." See FED. R. EVID. 415 (West 1995). (Although passed at the
same time, Rule 415 is beyond the scope of this Note.)
3137 CoNG. REc. S3191-02, at S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
4137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
5Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415. Introduction, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 265, 266 (1995) [hereinafter Perspectives].
6Myrna S. Raeder, Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415American
Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 343, 344 (1995).
7 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title
XXXUI, 320935, September 13,1994,108 Stat. 1796,2135; Perspectives, supra note 5, at 265.
8 See David J. Karp, Symposium on the Admission of Prior Offense Evidence in Sexual
Assault Cases: Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994). Karp was senior counsel for the Office of Policy
Development, United States Department of Justice. The ideas for new rules originated
in the Department of Justice and Karp was one of the drafters of the original text.
9See David P. Leonard, Perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415:
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305,305 (1995)
(Leonard argues that although the political process has always informed the rules, these
new amendments are so politically motivated as to have "radically changed the shape
of the rules" and to have created an exception to the principle that different types of
cases and different types of litigants should be treated similarly); see also James Joseph
Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly
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When the revisions were first proposed in March 1991, the proposal in the
Senate stated that "[tihe willingness of the courts to admit similar evidence in
prosecutions for serious sex crimes is of great importance to effective
prosecution in this area, and hence to the public's security against dangerous
sex offenders."10 In August 1994, then Senate minority leader Robert Dole
reiterated this position and claimed that the "tragic result" of sexual assault
cases predating these amendments was the inability of prosecutors to secure
convictions.11
Dole invoked the disturbing case of Charles R. Getz, who was convicted of
raping his 11-year-old daughter.12 In 1988, the Supreme Court of Delaware
overturned the conviction on the basis that evidence of prior assaults against
the child was improperly admitted at the trial level. 13 Senator Dole claimed
that the "tragic result" of the prohibition against introduction of character
evidence was that "the defendant walked."14
Dole's account misconstrues the effect of the Delaware court's decision. In
his political diatribe, Dole neglected to mention that Getz was immediately
retried and convicted without the introduction of evidence about his past
misconduct. Getz was found guilty of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in
prison, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.15 Thus, Getz's situation -
chosen by a politician to reveal the dangers of not admitting character evidence
against defendants accused of sexual assault and child molestation -- actually
demonstrates that convictions may be attained without resorting to the
admission of what has traditionally been considered improper propensity
evidence.
In its initial proposal of March 1991, the Senate Committee explained the
need to admit evidence of similar crimes in "serious" acts of sexual violence
towards women and children. The sponsors claimed that the revisions
governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases in which the accused
is charged with sexual assault or child molestation were designed to respond
to a growing need in American society. This exigency is not only the result of
increased violence towards women and children,16 but a reaction to the public
Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95,125 (1994).
10137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at S3238 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
11140 CONG. REc. S10273-03, at S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994).
12 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
1 3 1d.
14140 CoNG. REc. S10273-03, at S10276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994).
15 See Getz v. State, 582 A.2d 935 (Del. 1990).
16According to a 1989 Bureau of Justice Statistics study, 31.9% of released burglars
were rearrested for burglary, 24.8% of drug offenders were rearrested for a drug offense,
19.6% of violent robbers were rearrested for robbery, while only 7.7% of rapists were
rearrested for rape. Of all the offenses in the study, only homicide had a lower recidivism
rate, at 2.8%. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 572 (1994) (citing Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
1996]
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perception that the American legal system does not adequately respond to that
growing violence.
The passage of the revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence was part of the
response to this public outrage. This Note seeks to address both the potential
constitutional consequences of the newly passed Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414 and the problems that these revisions were designed to remedy. The
first section will introduce the history of the passage of these controversial
revisions as primarily a political process and one which bypassed the standard
rules of practice.17 The second section will address the procedural violations
and the troubling inconsistency of the new rules with the federal courts'
interpretation of the other Federal Rules of Evidence. The third portion of this
Note will address the substantive constitutional issues presented by these
amendments, including: violation of due process, 18 violation of double
jeopardy protection, 19 Eighth Amendment violation for punishment on the
basis of status20 and violation of the Equal Protection Clause.21 The fourth
section will address the countervailing needs for the new rules, including the
increasing rate of violence towards women and children and the inadequacy
of the criminal justice system to confront these challenges, and will conclude
with a proposal for revisions to the new rules which seek to avoid any
constitutional infirmity.22
II. BACKGROUND
In July 1991, a beauty pagent contestant accused superstar athlete Mike
Tyson of forcibly raping her in an Indianapolis hotel room.23 At trial, the
prosecution introduced evidence of prior similar violent behavior towards
women.24 Tyson was convicted of rape and served three years in prison.25
Department of Justice, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983 6 (1989)). It is fair to
assume that, due to the low percentage of rapes actually reported, this statistic does not
accurately reflect the number of rapes committed by repeat offenders. Davies, 27 CRIM
L. BULL. 504, 520 (1991) (only an estimated 10% of rapes are actually reported); see also
e.g., A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28
CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 453-54 (1982) (a study of an anonymous questionnaire given to
convicted rapists and child molesters indicates that, on average, they committed two to
five times as many sex crimes for which they were not apprehended).
17Raeder, supra note 6, at 345.
18U.S. CONsT. amend. V and )IV.
19U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
21U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22138 CONG. REC. S15160 (Sept. 25, 1992) (remarks by Sen. Dole).
23 Sonja Steptoe, A Damnable Defense, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 24,1992, at 92. Tyson
v. State of Indiana, 593 N.E.2d 175,176 (1992).
2 4Id.
[Vol. 42:169
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In the same year, William Kennedy Smith, nephew of the former president,
was arrested and charged with forcible rape.26 Three other women came
forward and claimed they had been sexually assaulted by Smith in the 1980s.27
At his trial, Smith's defense argued that introduction of his history of prior
sexual assaults would be improper use of character evidence. 28 The trial judge
excluded this evidence on the basis that the testimony would be devastating
to the defense, and that there was insufficient proof of similarity between the
alleged offense and the prior accusations.29 Testimony from the accusers was
withheld from the jury.30 Smith was acquitted. 31
The public perception surrounding these two controversial and highly
publicized cases was the legal system was fundamentally flawed. The cases
suggested that someone accused with atrocious crimes could be set free by
operation of a technical legal formality.32 Not only was the public shocked by
the information that it received from the press, but public confidence in the
criminal justice system was undermined by the general perception that
society's most deplorable criminals could be set free as a result of legal
technicalities. 33
The revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence 413 through 415 were
introduced primarily as a response to the public perception of inadequacy in
the prosecution of sexual predators.34 Although the amendments were first
introduced in March 1991, they were rejected by Democrats in Congress who
believed the rules would be found unconstitutional. 35 In April 1994, New York
Republican Representative Susan Molinari joined a substantial number of
the members of Congress who voted to block the passage of the Crime Bill.36
2 5 Don Pierson, Sports Digest, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 9,1996, at D2.
26 State v. Smith, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, # 91-005482 CF A.
2 7David A. Kaplan, Palm Beach Lessons, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at 30.
28 Id.
29 Cathy Booth, The Case That Was Not Heard, TIME, Dec. 23, 1991, at 38.
30Id.
31Smith, # 91-005482 CF A. See Kaplan, Palm Beach Lessons, at 30.
32Booth, The Case That Was Not Heard, at 38.
33Id.
34140 CONG. REC. H2415, at H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994); 138 CoNG. REC. S15160
(Sept. 25,1992); Duane, supra note 9, at 3; see generally Karp, supra note 8, at 15.
3 5Duane, supra note 9, at 95; Kenneth Cooper, House Nears Crime Bill Agreement;
Negotiators Scramble to Solve Policy Riffs on $30 Billion Plan, WASHNGTON POST, Aug. 21,
1994, Al, at A21.
36140 CONG. REC. H2415, at H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (remarks by Rep.
Molinari).
1996]
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Molinari announced her intention to block the bill unless it included the
amended rules of evidence for sex offense cases.37
After the election of a majority of Republican representatives to Congress,
President Clinton and the remaining Democrats in Congress were under
considerable pressure to pass some form of the Crime Bill.38 Desperate for votes
from Republicans, Congress finally acquiesced to Representative Molinari's
proposal.39 Many Democrats, wary of the new provisions but weary from the
deliberations, conceded that it was time to pass some form of satisfactory crime
legislation.4 0
Ill. PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS AND GENERAL INCONSISTENCIES WITH
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Congress bypassed the usual rule-making procedure by enacting the
amended rules in the form of legislation.4 1 The customary method of passing
amendments to federal procedural rules is through the Rules Enabling Act.42
This process calls for an Advisory Committee made up of scholars in the
relevant field, lawyers and judges, to draft a proposal for any amendment or
addition to the existing rules.43 The proposal is then subjected to a period of
public comment, reviewed by a subcommittee of the United States Judicial
Conference whose members are chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and finally subjected to Congressional review.44
On September 13,1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control
and Enforcement Act of 1994, consisting of crime legislation which included
the new evidence rules.45 The act created a mechanism granting the Judicial
Conference 150 days from the date of enactment to review the proposed rules
and submit recommendations or revisions to Congress.4 6 Although some
supported the new rules, many law professors, scholars and the American Bar
3 7William Douglas, Right, Left Oppose Crime Bill, NEWSDAY, Aug. 10, 1994, at 19; see
also, 140 CONG. REC. H8968, at H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks by Rep.
Molinari).
38Katherine Q. Seelye, House Approves Crime Bill After Days of Bargaining, Giving
Victory to Clinton, THE NEw YORK TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at Al..
3 9 Duane, supra note 9, at 96-97.
40Seelye, House Approves Crime Bill, at Al. Democratic Representative William J.
Hughes claimed that "some of the provisions are absolutely awful, [but it's] time to stop
fiddling and pass a crime bill." Id.
41Perspectives, supra note 5, at 266.
42Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2071-2077 (1944).
43Id.
44 Perspectives, supra note 5, at 266.
45See Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXXII, 320935.
46 Perspectives, supra note 5, at 266; see also Raeder, supra note 6, at 344.
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Association wrote in objection to their passage.47 The Judicial Conference
remained silent.48 The new rules officially became law on July 9, 1995.49
Several problems arise as a result of the subversion of the Rules Enabling
Process.50 Congress usurped the traditional role of scholars in the law and
drafted these evidence revisions without reference to the potential
constitutional issues involved or to the value of maintaining consistency
throughout the Federal Rules.51
In general, politicizing the passage of procedural rules increases the
likelihood that the rules will be politically remedial, but functionally
inadequate.52 The political motivation of enacting procedural rules is
safeguarded by the Rules Enabling Act practice which requires that any new
revisions are scrutinized by legal scholars. Although procedural rules always
have a political component and their operation evinces underlying substantive
policies of the law,53 the traditional process for passage has relegated those
policy determinations to authors who have little to gain politically.
The original drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 was intended
to adopt common law rules that had developed by the late 1960s.54 The Rules
were the result of an effort to achieve uniformity and consistency in the
application of codified practices. 55
Rules 413 and 414, however, were passed by Congress in a very contentious
political environment in which concessions were made in order to ensure
passage of comprehensive crime legislation.56 These amendments are
distinctive because they address a specific kind of case and treat litigants
differently according to the type of charge involved.57 The Federal Rules of
Evidence generally apply consistently to various types of cases and treat
litigants similarly.58
47 Raeder, supra note 6, at 344, and Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XX)CI, 320935 6(d)(2).
48 Raeder, supra note 6, at 345.
49 d. at 346.
50140 CONG. REC. H5437-03, at H5437 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (remarks by Rep.
Hughes included objections to the procedure bypassing the Rules Enabling Act "which
has served us well for a long time.").
51Raeder, supra note 6, at 345.
52 Leonard, supra note 9, at 305-06.
531d. at 306.
541d. at 312.
55 d., and notes cited therein. See also 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE: EVIDENCE 5006 (1977) (general history of the
drafting of the Federal Rule of Evidence).
56See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
57 Leonard, supra note 9, at 306.
581d. It should be noted that recently amended Rule 412, concerning the limitation of
19961
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Advocates of the new rules argued that the treatment of character evidence
or evidence of prior bad acts relating to character inferences had been
inconsistent among jurisdictions. 59 Sponsors specifically argued that evidence
relating to the particular crimes of sexual assault and child molestation
required special attention in the Federal Rules because of the inconsistency in
application among jurisdictions: "the law in this area has never been a model
of clarity and consistency."60
One of the justifications offered by political sponsors of the amendments was
that the adoption of the new rules would create clarity and consistency in the
regulation of character evidence in cases involving sexual crimes and child
molestation.61 Scholars writing in opposition to the new rules have argued that
despite Congress' attempt to create consistency in the specific area of law
concerning sex crimes, the result is further inconsistency in the application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in their entirety.62
Under the new amendments, sexual offenses, unlike other crimes, are treated
with the further presumption that evidence of prior acts or accusations is
admissible to show the probability of acting in conformity with a bad character
as to similar offenses.63 This added burden for the defense of sexual assault and
child molestation cases, even if applied consistently within that class of crimes,
arguably creates inequity in the treatment of other serious crimes with similar,
if not higher, rates of recidivism.64 According to many studies, the rate of
recidivism among sexual offenders is lower than that among repeat offenders
of other serious crimes:
[t]here appears to have been a widespread Congressional assumption
that a special rule of evidence is justified by some unusually high rate
of recidivism among sexual offenders, which would make evidence of
such criminal histories of unusually great probative value. But the
legislative history contains no empirical evidence to su 9port that
crucial assumption, and there is good reason to question it.
disclosure of an alleged victim's sexual history in sexual assault and harassment cases,
is also case-specific. See FED. R. EviD. 412.
59 Duane, supra note 9, at 111-12.
60137 CoNG. REC. S3191-02, at S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
611d.; Duane, supra note 9, at 103.
62 Duane, supra note 9, at 103-104.
63 FED. R. EVlD. 404(a). As opposed to general character evidence prohibition in
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) which reads: "[elvidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion." Id.
64 See also supra note.16 (in order to create true consistency, this type of prohibited
character evidence arguably should be admissible-in cases of crimes with higher
recidivism rates such as theft or murder).
65Duane, supra note 9, at 113; see also supra note 16.
[Vol. 42:169
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Additionally, the new amendments have serious drafting deficiencies. 66
There remains the troubling ambiguity regarding whether the amendments
permit the application of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which permits trial
judges to use their discretion to weigh the potential prejudice against the
probative value of the evidence before making a decision whether to admit or
exclude propensity evidence from the trier of fact.67 Rule 413 states that
"evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible ... for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant."68 From the plain reading of the rule, it is not clear whether judicial
discretion or the application of Rule 403 would be appropriate.
The original proposal in Congress, however, indicates that Rules 413 and 414
were not intended to preclude the application of all the other relevant
evidentiary rules.69 Drafters of the rules indicated in the legislative history that
the rule does not ensure admissibility in all cases. Rather, the new rules create
a presumption of a high degree of probativeness. 70 The original proposal in
March 1991 maintained that "[i]n general, the probative value of such evidence
is strong, and is not outweighed by any overriding risk of prejudice."71 The
impact of Rule 403 (and its conspicuous omission in the body of the new
amendments) is thereby minimized because the original drafters believed that,
in general, prejudice was not a real concern.72 The new rules create a
presumption that the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
risk of unfair prejudice in cases of sexual crimes and child molestation. Only
by reference to the legislative history can a defendant argue that Rule 403
should operate to rebut this strong presumption.73
66Norman M. Garland, Perspectives on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415:
Some Thoughts on the Sexual Misconduct Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 355, 357 (1995).
67FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Id. See also Garland, supra note 66, at 357; Duane, supra note 9, at 118-19.
68 FED. R. EVID. 413 (emphasis added).
69137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) ("admission and
consideration of [evidence of other crimes by the defendant in sexual assault
prosecutions] under other rules will not be limited or impaired.").
7OKarp, supra note 8, at 18.
71137 CONG REC. S3191-02, at 53239 (daily ed. Mar. 13,1991).
72 Id. at 53239 (daily ed. Mar. 13,1991). The issue of prejudice forms a substantial part
of my argument that the new rules are a violation of the defendant's due process rights.
See infra section IV. A. (1) Risk of Misdecision from Prejudice.
73 The operation of Rule 403 in connection with the new rules is still highly suspect.
Accurate drafting of the amendments, rather than expository explanation in the
19961
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Lastly, the rules as drafted do not specify the form that the prior bad acts
may take.74 Rule 413 only specifies that evidence of "the defendant's commission
of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible."75 It is not clear
from the drafting of the rules whether the prior bad act would have to include
a conviction. The rule appears to cover acquittals or even accusations. The
drafting leaves unresolved the nature of the standard of proof required in order
to admit the prior act evidence, even for the limited purpose of establishing
propensity.76 The current drafting of the amendments does not make clear what
degree of proof is necessary in order to qualify prior bad acts as admissible.
Although the defense may counter the introduction of unsubstantiated
evidence, the nature of sexual crimes and crimes committed against children
is potentially so inflammatory as to unduly influence a jury. Thus, the mere
mention- of potential prior bad acts may be sufficient to cause substantial
prejudice.
The strictly procedural complications of sloppy draftsmanship have
substantive repercussions. The withdrawal of the judicial oversight function,
the creation of intrinsic inconsistencies within the Federal Rules caused by
politicization of the rule-making process and the failure to specify the standard
of proof required in order to make prior bad acts admissible potentially create
substantive constitutional crises.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND THE AMENDED
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Procedural Due Process Violation
In the debate over state incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process of law, the Supreme Court took the position that due process
legislative history, would have resolved this troubling ambiguity. Eileen A. Scallen, The
Federal Rules of Evidence in Retrospect: Observations from the 1995 AALS Evidence Section:
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Useand Abuse oftheAdvisory Committee Notes,
28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1283,1290-91 (1995). Scallen argues that the plain reading of rules
discounts the legislative intention of the drafters of rules. Although the essay stresses
the importance of published notes which give "great weight in interpreting the Rules,"
they are still always secondary to the text of the rule itself. Id. Accord Williamson v.
United States, 114 S.Ct. 2431,2436 (1994) (if thepolicyis clearly expressed in the statutory
text, it outweighs whatever force the legislative notes may have).
74 Garland, supra note 66, at 357.
75FED. R. EVID. 413 (emphasis added).
76 Garland, supra note 66, at 357.
[C]ritics state that the ambiguity in failing to specify any standard
of proof is problematic. Some of the detractors assert that only
evidence of a conviction should be permitted for such uncharged
acts to be admissible. Other detractors suggest that if not limited
to evidence of convictions, the uncharged acts evidence must pass
the test of "clear and convincing.")
Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 42:169
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was designed to protect the criminal defendant from the exercise of
government power that would deprive the individual of his "fundamental"
rights. 77 By example, in Hurtado v. California, the Court sustained a California
law which permitted criminal proceedings to be initiated by information
instead of by grand jury indictment.78 The opinion stated that: "any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."79 The
difficulty in evaluating whether a particular right is protected by Fourteenth
Amendment due process, to use the terminology of Hurtado, is the
determination that a certain right is "fundamental" or is constitutive of our
shared "principles of liberty."
The admission of evidence under Rules 413 and 414 of the commission of
prior sexual assaults or child molestation creates a large chasm in the already
weakening prohibition against character evidence. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible because of the
likelihood that jurors would use the evidence improperly to make associations
about the character of the accused, already may be admitted for other
purposes.80 There now is a possibility that, under Rules 413 and 414, evidence
of prior commissions of sexual assault or child molestation will be used
improperly by the jury and will profoundly prejudice defendants.81
According to the common law tradition, propensity evidence was deemed
to be too prejudicial: "[courts . . . have come to disallow resort by the
prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish
a probability of his guilt."82 The theory excluding character evidence to prove
guilt of the present charge is not that the evidence of the prior act lacked proba-
7 7 CERALD GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411 (1991).
78110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
79 d. at 537 (emphasis added).
80 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Rule 404(b) reads in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Id.
81Some scholars have rejected the notion, however, that jurors cannot be trusted with
potentially prejudicial information. In discussing the role of evidentiary rules, David J.
Karp wrote "[wlhen I make my own assessment of evidentiary rules, I start by asking
myself what information a reasonable person would want to have in deciding an
important matter." Karp, supra note 8, at 26.
82 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475 (1948).
19961
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probative value, but that it is overpersuasive and unduly prejudicial. 83 As
stated by Justice Jackson in Michelson v. United States:
[tihe state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law,
specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though
such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a
probable perpetrator of the crimes. The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with
the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge.
84
Evidence of prior bad acts tends to affect adversely the decision of the jury.
Evidence of prior sexual assault and child molestation would arguably have a
greater effect on the jury than evidence of prior nonviolent or nonsexual
crimes.85
Due process requires that a criminal defendant be judged according to the
relevant evidence pertinent to the present charge. The new amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence state that evidence of prior acts is admissible for any
purpose for which it is relevant.86 Sponsors of the amendments argued that the
jury should be allowed to calculate the improbability that the same person
would be mistakenly accused of the same act twice.87 The common law concept
of fundamental rights and ordered liberty may well be threatened by the
presumption that similar act evidence should automatically be admitted.
83 1d. at 476.
84 1d. at 475-76.
85 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (prior act evidence relating to sexual
assault is perhaps more damaging to the defense because it is more provocative than
other act evidence relating to crimes which are not perceived by society with such
abhorrence).
86FED. R. EVID. 413 and 414; 137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at S3239-240 (daily ed. Mar.
13,1991). Sponsors argued that the prior act evidence is simply too probative to exclude
from the purview of the jury. The limitation on the evidence was that the prior act
evidence would not go to character generally but would only be admissible if it related
to other crimes by the defendant that were of the same type for which he is formally
charged. Ironically, as the level of probativeness rises, the potential for a constitutional
violation proportionately increases. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
87137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13,1991). This inference creates
an equal protection challenge to the new federal rules because juries determining a case
of sexual assault or child molestation (as opposed to theft or murder or any number of
other violent crimes) will be permitted, if not encouraged, to gauge the likelihood of
guilt from a probabilistic calculus. The concern is that the prosecution will have
increased impetus to investigate suspects with a prior record. Because the new
amendments are so recently enacted, there have been no reported cases challenging the
apprehension of a known repeat offender on this basis. Still, the likelihood of false
prosecutions based on this probabilistic evaluation endangers the principle of the equal
protection of the law.
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1. Risk of Misdecision from Prejudice
The risk of due process violation is increased by the potential that a jury will
be prejudiced by explicit reference to prior bad sexual acts. There is a substantial
risk that jurors will be emotionally overwhelmed by graphic accounts of prior
sexual assaults or child molestation by witnesses who never formally charged
the defendant with these crimes.88
The risk of misdecision is greatest when the jury is likely to find the
character of the accused's uncharged misconduct repugnant or
revolting. The admission of testimony about that type of misconduct
can poison the jurors' minds and generate an overmastering hostility
against the accused.
Evidence of sexual misconduct or child molestation by an accused has
an extraordinary tendency to create such hostility.
89
The common law prohibition of character evidence was premised upon the
likelihood of an emotional repugnancy toward a defendant who has a record
of similar acts.90 In the case of sexual assault and child molestation, that
likelihood is arguably greater. Thus, Wigmore offers the following assessment
in his treatise:
[i]t may almost be said that it is because of the indubitable relevancy of
specific bad acts showing the character of the accused that such
evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not because it has no
appreciable probative value but because it has too much. The natural
and inevitable tendency of the tribunal ... is to give excessive weight
to the vicious record of crime.
91
2. Jury Immunity and Diminished Regret
Jurors who are overwhelmed by evidence of past criminal behavior could
feel less responsibility for their decision to convict even absent sufficient
evidence to make a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.92 Jurors
who convict without sufficient proof will not regret their decision if they truly
88Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476; Leonard, supra note 9, at 310; Edward J. Imwinkelreid,
Perspectives on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: Undertaking the Task of Reforming
the American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off
on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285,296 (1995) [hereinafter Undertaking the Task].
See also supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text: the standard of proof required to
establish prior act evidence is troubling in this context because of the danger that thejury may be overpersuaded by the mere mention of a totally unproven act.
8 9 Undertaking the Task, supra note 88, at 296 (citations omitted).
90 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
9 1JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 62.2 at 1212-13
(Tillers, rev. ed. 1983) (emphasis added).
92 Duane, supra note 9, at 103.
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believe that someone with a bad record is deserving of punishment, regardless
of the level of proof for the charged crime.93
One of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic evidence is
that the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but
for the extrinsic offense... the jury may feel that the defendant should
be punished for that [prior] activity even if he is not guilty of the offense
charged.
94
The jury's feeling of immunity for decisions which may be legally insufficient
insulates an improper decision and may make such decisions more likely.
Evidence of prior bad acts has been widely presumed to carry the risk
of unfair prejudice because of the grave possibility that jurors, even if
they do not conclude that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, will be inclined to convict him (at least in
part) on the basis of their disapproval of his prior crimes, or their hunch
that he has committed other crimes for which he was never caught.
95
Thus, the jury may convict without making a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on the basis of facts regarding the present charge. In that case,
the defendant is deprived of due process rights because the jury might convict
on the basis of prejudice, meanwhile protected by a feeling of immunity.
Another problem with admitting evidence of uncharged (and therefore
unpunished) prior acts is the possibility that juries will convict for the current
charge without sufficient evidence of guilt in order to vindicate the unpunished
prior crimes. If a juror is persuaded by the other act evidence that the defendant
deserves punishment, that juror may choose to disregard the paucity of
evidence to sustain the current charge and convict nevertheless. 96
Unlike the jury who must base its conviction upon substantial evidence of
the charged crime, the jury who is informed of the defendant's prior record
93 See D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 294 (1989). Lewis
describes how scholars believe that the fact finder will experience "diminished regret
about possible error in a determination of guilt when the fact finder learns that the
accused is an 'evil person."' Id.
94 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,914 (5th Cir. 1978).
95Duane, supra note 9, at 110.
96As yet, there has been no reported case in which this principle has been
demonstrated. The potential that the application of the amended evidentiary rules will
lead to the suspension of the Government's constitutional burden may be sufficient to
determine that the new rules are unconstitutional. It is not suprising that there are no
reported cases: the rules are fairly new and not yet adopted by any states and the
possibility that a jury will confirm the suspicion that it has decided a case improperly
is at best negligible.
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(even a record of accusations without charges or convictions) may feel
insulated in its decision to convict without adequate proof.97
3. Rules Do Not Require Prosecution to Sustain Its Burden of Proof
Admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses may have such a persuasive
influence over the jury that the level of proof required for a conviction is
diminished. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees
protect the expectation that, in criminal cases, the government must establish
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.98
The Court in In Re Winship held that: "'[d]ue process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of...
convincing the fact finder of his guilt.'" 99 The Court explicitly held that due
process required the prosecution to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged."100
The new amendments to the Federal Rules create the presumption to admit
evidence of prior 'commissions' of acts of sexual violence or child
molestation. 101 Commissions may include convictions, acquittals and
accusations. 102 Thus, the defendant may be convicted on the basis of rumor,
coincidence or the convincing testimony of an accuser who has never pressed
charges. 103
This difficulty would arise in a case in which a sympathetic plaintiff cannot
muster sufficient evidence of the charged crime to compel a conviction. In that
case, evidence by accusers of prior uncharged misconduct might cause a jury
to convict for the past crimes on the belief either that the defendant should not
be allowed to get away with repeated assaults or on the belief in the statistical
unlikelihood that the same defendant would be accused of similar crimes more
than once without actually having committed them. This scenario represents
97 Lewis, supra note 93, at 326.
981d., at 294; U.S. CoNsT. amend V and XIV.
991n Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S 513,
525-26 (1958)).
lOOId.
101FED. R. EviD. 413 and 414.
102 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
103A response to this argument is that the defense has the opportunity to counter the
testimony of uncharged misconduct with evidence tending to prove that the defendant
was innocent of theconduct alleged by the accusations. Still, presentation of this rebuttal
evidence is arguably time-consuming and expensive for the defense and the admission
of accusations may be so prejudicial as to jeopardize severely the defendant's chances
of successful rebuttal.
Sponsors countered these arguments by claiming that the prior commissions are
so relevant, in balance, their admission is not unduly prejudicial. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text. This argument, however, fails to address the standard of proof
requirement.
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an occasion in which the prosecutor would be relieved of its constitutional duty
to prove all the facts of the present charge beyond a reasonable doubt.1 0 4
B. Violation of the Protection Against Double Jeopardy
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o
person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."105 This provision ensures that no defendant can be made to stand
trial for the same offense more than once. This provision is potentially violated
in instances in which the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of a prior act
for which the defendant was acquitted.
New rules 413 and 414 permit the admission of evidence of prior acquittals
in order to show that defendant acted in similar fashion in the current case.106
The purpose of the introduction of this evidence is to convince a jury of the
defendant's guilt by reintroducing evidence used in past trials, including
acquittals. The defendant may in effect be made to stand suit to the prior offense
twice. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is thereby
potentially violated.
In a Sixth Circuit case, Oliphant v. Koehler, defendant Oliphant appealed his
conviction for forcible rape of a Michigan State University freshman. 107 At the
jury trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses who testified to similar
experiences with the defendant which resulted in acquittals. Although the
majority found that the evidence was admissible to show a course of conduct
or plan under Federal Rule 404(b), 10 8 Chief Judge Edwards, in a dissenting
opinion, stated that introduction of their testimony violated the Fifth
Amendment protection from double jeopardy:
[t]he constitutional problem is posed by the fact that in both of these
instances that identical charge had been filed by each of these two
witnesses, appellant had been subjected to a jury trial, and the jury had
10 4In Re Winship, at 364; see supra notes 94 and 95. 1 would argue, however, that the
admission of prior act evidence, even if or perhaps by virtue of being admitted without
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, creates a permissive and not a mandatory presump-
tion. In other words, the jury is free to use the information to inform them, but are under
no legal obligation to convict the defendant for his past crimes. According to Justice
O'Connor: "mandatory presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the
State of the burden of persuasion on an element of the offense. By contrast, a permissive
inference is not a violation of due process because the State still has the burden of
persuading the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the
predicate facts proved." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 78-79 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
105U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
10 6FED. R. EviD. 413, 414.
107 Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547, 547 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877
(1979).
108FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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found him "not guilty." To allow these same complainants to testify to
these same events to buttress another complainant's charge of the same
offense committed against her appears to me to allow appellant to be
put in jeopardy twice in each such instance. 109
Supreme Court Justice Brennan agreed in Dowling v. United States.110 In his
vigorous dissent, Brennan asserted that the introduction of evidence used to
attain a prior acquittal, when introduced under Rule 404(b) for purposes other
than character, was still an impermissible violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause: "[b]ecause the introduction of this testimony effectively forced
petitioner to defend against charges for which he had already been acquitted,
the doctrine of criminal collateral estoppel grounded in the Double Jeopardy
Clause should have prohibited the Government from introducing the
testimony."111 Justice Brennan reiterated the constitutional function of the
Double Jeopardy Clause: "an acquittal reflects both an institutional interest in
preserving the finality of judgments and a strong public interest in protecting
individuals against governmental overreaching." 112 The purpose of the
protection against double jeopardy is to prevent the government, with its vastly
superior resources, from wearing down the defendant and also protects a
defendant against living in a continuous state of anxiety about whether or not
he will be retried. 113
In addition, although not of constitutional relevance, the introduction of this
evidence would require the defendant to respond with rebuttal evidence
presumably already introduced as evidence in the former trial resulting in an
acquittal. This would lead to a 'trial within a trial' in order to include the
presentation of rebuttal evidence. 114 The introduction of redundant evidence
would arguably be a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and might
unnecessarily prolong the presentation of evidence or risk confusing and
distracting the jury.1 5
In Oliphant v. Koehler, the majority held that-
[d]efendant is not on trial for the offense charged against him in the
prior case. The question presently at issue is whether, as charged by
the prosecution, he [committed the elements of the present crime].
Testimony tending legitimately to establish such offense, or some
element thereof, may not be excluded solely on the ground that it was
1090liphant, 594 F.2d at 556.
llODowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,354 (1990).
111Id.
112 d. at 355.
1131d.
114 Duane, supra note 9, at 124.
115Id. at 124-25.
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offered and received in the prior case as bearing on defendant's guilt
of the offense there charged.
116
The conclusion, that such use is legitimate, essentially begs the question of
whether the introduction of the same evidence used in the previous trials
resulting in acquittals constitutes a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The real issue is whether or not this introduction is itself legitimate.
In Dowling v. United States, the majority decision written by Justice White
held that:
we decline to extend ... the collateral-estoppel component of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances,... relevant
and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules
of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged criminal conduct for
which a defendant has been acquitted.
117
Justice White refused to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause, which is meant to
protect the defendant from relitigation of "an issue of ultimate fact," to the
introduction of evidence that merely "relates to alleged criminal conduct for
which a defendant has been acquitted."118 According to the majority holding
in Dowling, the prosecution may introduce evidence in a subsequent trial
although the issue underlying the evidence has already been litigated, so long
as the prosecution does not intend to have the jury make a finding as to ultimate
guilt or innocence on the prior evidence.119
Therefore, according to Dowling, the concerns noted above are of little
importance and the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidence
sought to be introduced does not bear on the ultimate issue of guilt or
innocence.120 Furthermore, although the new amendments pemit the
admission of evidence from a prior trial which resulted in an acquittal, they do
not attest to the veracity of that evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence bear
upon the admissibility, not the credibility of the evidence sought to be
introduced. 121 Dowling suggests that defendants are still capable of mounting
a formidable defense by introducing the same evidence that established their
innocence in the first trial. Thus, if the same defendant was able to convince a
jury to acquit based on the evidence previously presented, then arguably that
same evidence should be sufficient to counteract the prosecution's ability to
introduce contrary evidence. 122The sponsors of the new amendments, in the
1160liphant, 594 F.2d at 554 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Johnson, 43 N.W.2d
334,340 (1950)).
117 Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348.
118 d. at 342.
119 d.
120 d.
1 2 1 FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
122 Garland, supra note 66, at 359.
[Vol. 42:169
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss2/5
BRANDING THE SEXUAL PREDATOR
legislative history if not in the plain reading of the rules themselves, admit the
exercise of the judge's discretion and the use of Rule 403 balancing.123
Under the revised rules, the prosecution may only introduce evidence used
in prior trials leading to acquittals; it cannot attest to its veracity. In other words,
as is the case with all evidence introduced at trial, the prior act evidence must
be weighed by the jury and, because in another proceeding the evidence
formerly led to an acquittal, it may well be regarded with less deference. The
new rules only permit the evidence to be admitted, they do not prescribe the
significance to be attributed to that evidence.
Thus, under Dowling, the Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy
is not violated if the prior act evidence introduced does not bear on the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence of the accused as to the prior acquittals. The facts
of prior acquittals may not be introduced for the purpose of relitigating the
decisions to acquit rendered in an earlier proceeding. Under the new
amendments, however, evidence giving rise to a prior acquittal may be
introduced to bear on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence for the present
similar charge. The impetus to reintroduce this evidence is to bear on the
present charge and to demonstrate, by allusion to propensity, the likelihood
that the accused is guilty.
The Dowling approach insists that merely relitigating facts of prior bad acts
is substantially different from introducing those previous acts to demonstrate
the likelihood that defendant is guilty of the present charge. This delicate
distinction may well be lost on a jury. Although this does not represent a
technical violation of the Constitution, a practical result is that jurors will
balance the prior act evidence which resulted in an acquittal in their ultimate
evaluation of guilt or innocence for the current charge.
C. Violation of the Eighth Amendment Protection of Punishment for Status
Criminalization of a person's status offends the constitutional protection
from cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California held a California statute making an addiction to narcotics a criminal
offense inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 124 The California statute considered in Robinson did
If that jury stopped to consider seriously the questions presented by
evidence of multiple acts of the accused, I think that in most instances
they can be trusted to decide whether they believe the accused did
those acts or not. In fact, if the jury comes to the conclusion that the
prosecution has attempted to convict the accused of acts he did not
commit (because the evidence is weak), then the jury might be inclined
to hold that against the prosecution, not the accused.
Id.
123 See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
124 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,660 (1962); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII and XIV.
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not punish conduct related to the use, sale, purchase or possession of drugs. 125
Rather, the law "[made] the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for
which the offender may be prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms."' 126 The
Court held that punishment for being affected by disease "would doubtless be
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."127 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, concluded that "[e]ven one day in prison would be a
cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold."128
Although the criminalization of status offends the Eighth Amendment
protection from cruel and unusual punishment, the Court in Robinson conceded
that "a person's character or status can be a legitimate consideration during the
later sentencing phase of the trial after there has been a determination that the
accused perpetrated a crime."129 In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court
upheld a Texas recidivist statute and maintained that the mandatory life
sentence for repeat offenders does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 130 The Court
held:
the primary goals [of a recidivist statute] are to deter repeat offenders
and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal
offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that
person from the rest of society for an extended period of time. This
segregation and its duration are based not merely on that person's
most recent offense but also on the propensities he has demonstrated over
a period of time.131
According to the Rummel decision, therefore, the trier at the sentencing stage
may fairly be informed by the accused's propensity to repeat his offenses. 132
The issue raised by the new Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 is whether
or not they are, in essence, punishment for status or whether they merely
inform the level of punishment. The issue is whether or not the propensity to
commit crimes of sexual assault or child molestation is truly a character
disposition, or status. The sponsors of the new rules argued that in order for
the evidence to be admissible under the new rules:
125 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
126 1d.
127jd.
1281d. at 667.
129 Edward J. Imwinkelreid, A Small Contribution to the Debate Over the Proposed
Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1125, 1145 (1993) [hereinafterA Small Contribution].
130Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
13 11d. (emphasis added).
13 2 d.
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the evidence must be of such a character as to indicate that the
defendant has the unusual combination of aggressive and sexual
impulses that motivates the commission of such crimes, and a lack of
effective inhibitions against acting on such impulses.... Evidence of
other acts of molestation indicates that the defendant has a type of
desire or impulse - a sexual or sado-sexual interest in children - that
simply does not exist in ordinary people.
133
This description of the evidence sought to be introduced by these new rules
indicates that at least the sponsors believed this evidence was especially
relevant because of its bearing on the status of the offender.134
The new rules permit the prosecution to introduce evidence of character in
order to show conduct in conformity with past acts on the present occasion.1 35
The difficulty arises when the prosecution, lacking sufficient evidence to
convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the present charge, persuades a
jury to use evidence of prior bad acts in order to convict 136 In that instance, as
in Robinson, the verdict may be based on the jury's belief that the accused fits
the definition of a sexual predator or a child molester, and not on the sufficiency
of the evidence of the current charge. In such a case, the State may secure a
conviction based on status, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and is
relieved of its constitutional duty to prove all elements of the present charge.
In the hypothetical instance in which the jury convicts based upon the
accused's status as a sexual offender, the constitutional right against cruel and
unusual punishment is abrogated. However, before the passage of Rules 413
through 415, evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible "to show
lustful disposition" or "depraved sexual instinct" especially in cases involving
children. 137 The exception to the character evidence prohibition (before the
passage of the new federal rules) was based upon two rationales: the high rate
of recidivism among child molesters and the special need to bolster the
testimony of a solitary child victim-witness.138 In at least one case, however,
133137 CONG. REc. S3191-02, at S3240 (daily ed. Mar. 13,1991).
134A Small Contribution, supra note 129, at 1145-46. Professor Imwinkelreid has
suggested that this status problem may be remedied by the judge instructing the jury
as to the permitted use of the prior act evidence. It is possible that the problem to be
avoided by the use of a jury limiting instruction -- i.e., characterization of the accused
as a repeat offender, as sexual predator or as a child molester -- is no longer necessary
under the new revised Federal Rules.
135 FED. R. EvID. 413, 414.
136 The jury may have a tendency to convict a defendant without sufficient evidence
of the current charge in order to punish him for prior unpunished crimes. See notes 92-97
and accompanying text.
137 Bryden & Park, supra note 16, at 557.
1381d. at 558.
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Lannan v. State,139 the court held that sex offenses were not special enough to
justify a unique exception and that although recidivism rates for sex offenders
was high, it believed it to be no higher than for drug offenders.140
The relative probativeness of the rates of recidivism for sexual offenders and
child molesters is a matter of empirical verification. The new rules may violate
the Eighth Amendment protection from punishment for status because they
permit a jury to convict on the basis of other act evidence instead of upon the
sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the current charge.
D. Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
There are two Equal Protection challenges to the new Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414. First of all, the new rules create a potential for the
unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals.141 According to a Bureau
of Justice Statistics study documenting rates of recidivism found among
prisoners who were rearrested for the same crimes, rape has a relatively low
rate of recidivism.142 Thus, the eradication of the character evidence
prohibition seems to discriminate unfairly against those individuals accused
of sexual offenses and child molestation.143 This exception established by the
new amendments violates the principle that different types of criminals and
different types of cases should be treated similarly for the purposes of trial
procedure. 144 This discrimination, if not empirically justified, may be a
violation of the accused's right to equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 145
Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply only in suits arising in federal
court. Although most cases of sexual assault or child molestation arise under
state law, the new amendments, at least for a time, may apply unfairly to
discriminate against Native Americans. 146 The federal rules only apply in cases
or controversies arising under federal law.147 The new amendments would
139Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992).
1401d. at 1337; see also supra note 16 (discussing relative recidivism rates among violent
crimes).
141James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415 - Some Problems and
Recommendations, 20 U. DAYToN L. REV. 753, 754 (1995) (proposed new rules create the
potential for unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals, i.e., a high proportion
of robberies are committed by 'career robbers' and they are treated differently from
'career rapists' under these rules).
142See supra note 16 for statistics regarding rates of recidivism and the difficulties with
those statistics.
143See supra note 141.
144Leonard, supra note 9, at 305.
145U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
146Duane, supra note 9, at 113-15.
1471d. Federal jurisdiction would encompass crimes which occur on Indian
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likely disproportionately effect cases which occur on Indian land. Therefore,
"federal sex crime prosecutions are disproportionately targeted at Native
American defendants. In the year ending September 30, 1993, for example,
Native Americans made up 80% of all defendants convicted of sexual abuse
crimes in federal court - but less than 1% of the country's population."148
The Supreme Court in United State v. Antelope held that, although the
procedural rules governing prosecution of a Native American defendant may
have been different from the rules applicable to an Idaho state resident, the
Equal Protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated.149
The Court held that: "[u]nder our federal system, the National Government
does not violate equal protection when its own body of law is evenhanded,
regardless of the laws of States with respect to the same subject matter."150
Although the application of the Federal Rules, in their effect, would
disproportionately affect Native Americans, 151 the rules create a regulatory
scheme which is applied evenhandedly to all those accused within its
jurisdiction.152 Thus, just as the Court held in Antelope that application of a
federal regulatory scheme does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, neither
would the application of a new evidentiary scheme in the prosecution of sexual
offenders. 153
Although the racially disparate impact of the new rules 'by itself, does not
amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, it entails a profound
political price that ought not to be undertaken lightly.... This nation's shameful
legacy of unequal and discriminatory treatment of Native Americans is by now
common knowledge. 154 Although not necessarily a constitutional
transgression, the potential for disparate impact of the new evidentiary
amendments may cost a substantial social price.
reservations and federal property including national parks, military bases, or the
territorial waters of the United States.
148 d. at 114 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1993, at 18, Table No. 18 (1993)).
149United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 649 (1977).
15OId.
15 1The federal scheme is also created with the intention to serve as a model for state
procedure: the "proposed new rules would apply directly in federal cases, and would
have broader significance as a potential for state reforms." 137 CONG. REC. S3191-02, at
S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991).
152Antelope, 430 U.S. at 649-650. 'The Federal Government treated respondents in the
same manner as all other persons within federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory
scheme that did not erect impermissible racial classifications." Id.
153Id. at 649.
154Duane, supra note 9, at 114-15.
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V. COUNTERVAILING NEEDS FOR THE NEW RULES
Although the new rules potentially encounter many constitutional impasses,
the issues that they are designed to address are real and very troubling.
According to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1992, violent attacks by men
is the primary health risk to American women.1 55 In advocating the passage of
the new rules, Senator Dole claimed that a "staggering 2.5 million violent crimes
are committed against women each year."156 Congressional Representative
Tom Lewis spoke in support of the amendments: "[m]any of those who commit
crimes of sexual assault and child molestation have a terrible history of sexually
violent and abusive behavior, terrorizing victim after victim with
circumstances making it difficult to prosecute effectively. [The new rules] will
help break many of these chains of violence."157
The problems of sexual violence against women and abuse and molestation
of children are compelling and the rising statistics of abuse are daunting.
158
Rape and molestation are among the most violent offenses that can be
committed against a person short of homicide.159
The statistics of repeat offenders among rapists and child molestors show
that other crimes, such as burglary and drug offenses, have considerably higher
rates of recidivism.160 The statistics bearing upon the issue of recidivism,
however, must be seriously questioned because they do not reflect the many
rapes which remain unreported. 16 1 The relatively low rate of recidivism for
rape is arguably misleading because incidents of rape are largely
unreported. 162
In fact, a further difficulty with sexual violence and child molestation is that
the repeat offenders are more likely to be psychologically predisposed to sexual
violence than other crimes with higher recidivism rates. For example, a thief
will probably steal in order to provide himself with money or other resources.
If the circumstances were different, i.e., if that thief were suddenly wealthy, the
chances of repetition might logically decline significantly. However, there is no
environmental duress which causes a man to rape. There is, more reasonably,
a compulsion or a predisposition to rape or molest, and changed circumstances
155138 CONG. REc. S15160 (Sept. 25,1992) (remarks by Sen. Dole).
156Id.
157140 CONG. REC. E1403 Ouly 1, 1994) (extensions of remarks by Florida Rep. Tom
Lewis).
158A Small Contribution, supra note 129, at 1149.
159 d.
160 5ee Bryden & Park, supra note 16.
16 11d.
162 Davies, supra note 16, at 520 (statistics showing that the reporting of rapes is as low
as 10%).
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would not logically have any bearing on the repetitive nature of the crime.163
"[E]vidence showing that the defendant has committed sexual assaults on other
occasions places him in a small class of depraved criminals."164 Thus,
information bearing upon the defendant's psychological predispositions are
perhaps more probative in the context of sexual assault or child molestation
than in the context of other crimes. 165
The political motivation influencing the sponsors of the new rules was the
need to convict more criminals and to ensure greater safety.166 The aspiration
is to deter crime and to convict those accused.167 Whether or not the new rules
are effective in achieving these goals and whether their potential violations of
fundamental constitutional principles are worth the experiment is still open to
question.168
Beside achieving their goals of higher conviction rates and increased safety,
the rules respond to the public perception that the criminal justice system is
radically unfair and ineffective in its prosecution of crimes against women and
children. 16 9 Rape and child molestation present different problems to the
rule-drafters: these crimes have as their victims those members of society who
have a diminished political voice. Both women and children victims have,
traditionally, been discounted both in the courtroom and in the public view.170
163In determining whether prior act evidence is predictive, commentators of the new
rules espoused various theories. These psychological theories (trait theory, situationism
and interactionism) are described in further detail in other articles. See, e.g., Leonard,
supra note 9, at 316; Imwinkelreid, Symposium on the Admission of Prior Offense Evidence
in Sexual Assault Cases: Some Comments About Mr. David Karp's Remarks on Propensity
Evidence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37, 44 (1994); Undertaking the Task, supra note 88, at 295;
Bryden & Park, supra note 16, at 562.
164 Karp, supra note 8, at 24.
1651d. (evidence that defendant falls within this small class of depraved criminals "is
likely to be highly probative in relation to the pending charge.").
166137 CONG. REc. S3191-02, at S3238 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) ("[tlhe willingness of
the courts to admit similar crimes evidence in prosecutions for serious sex crimes is of
great importance to effective prosecution in this area, and hence to the public security
against dangerous sex offenders.").
167But see data compiled by the United States District Courts for the year ending June
30,1992, in which the prosecution for rape was able to obtain conviction in 84% of all
sex offense prosecutions in federal court. This statistic was significantly higher than
convictions in only 78.2% of larceny and theft cases, 5.8/6 of all homicide cases, and
64.7% of its assault cases. Duane, supra note 8, at 100. Most rape and molestation charges
are brought in state court, however, so these statistics are not necessarily generally
demonstrative.
168A Small Contribution, supra note 129, at 1150.
169138 CONG. REC. S15160 (Sept. 25, 1992) (remarks by Sen. Dole).
170At common law, the character of the victim of sexual assault was at issue: 'both at
common law and under the Federal Rules, a party was sometimes allowed to prove the
alleged victim's character. Along similar lines, many states at common law permitted
the defendant to offer evidence of an alleged rape victim's unchaste character." Leonard,
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In the courtroom, although the trial is designed to adjudicate the guilt or
innocence of the accused, it is often the case that women-victims are subjected
to close scrutiny and a high degree of prejudice.17 1
The crime of rape, unlike other violent crimes, involves the element of
consent and thus the issue of the accused's perception is at issue.172 Certainly
if the defendant uses the defense of consent, the victim should have the right
to counter by arguing that the defendant should have understood the victim's
lack of consent. Repeat offenses of rape and sexual molestation are indeed
probative to ascertain the defendant's claimed miscomprehension of consent.
In addition, crimes of sexual violence rarely have eyewitnesses. The trial,
therefore, becomes a credibility contest.173 It is difficult to make an educated
assessment of the relative credibility of the victim and the defendant without
admitting evidence of the accused's prior bad acts.
In her argument before the House of Representatives, Representative
Molinari claimed that the law predating the new amendments resulted in the
"ironic result that serial rapists and child molesters go free of the accused's prior
bad acts, because current law encourages reversals."174 There is, however, an
eighty-four percent federal conviction rate for sex offense prosecutions which
is considerably higher than for other crimes.1Th The primary reason for this
statistic is the "extent to which evidence of prior sexual offenses is already
admissible under current law in cases where such evidence is unusually
probative or used to negate the defense of consent."176 The extent to which the
new rules represent a more effective response to the violence committed
against women and children in American society remains largely a question of
supra note 9, at 309-310. This tactic has been somewhat curtailed by the passage of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 412.
171Bryden & Park, supra note 16, at 578. Especially "in acquaintance rape cases, the
evidence of prior sexual assaults by the accused may help to combat prejudice against
victims. Researchers have shown that jurors have a tendency to blame the victim in
acquaintance rape cases." Id.
1721d. at 575-78.
173Karp, supra note 8, at 32.
The court is presented with unequivocally different versions of the
incident. The defendant claims that it was a romantic interlude. The
victim says that she was raped. The evidence of other sexually assaultive
behavior by the defendant is admitted because it makes the victim's
version more probable and the defendant's less so.
Id.
174140 CONG. REC. H2415-04, at H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (remarks by Rep.
Molinari).
175Karp, supra note 8, at 24.
176 d. Evidence of prior misconduct is admissible for non-character related reasons
under Rule 404(b). SeeA Small Contribution, supra note 129, at 1132-36 (prior act evidence
may be introduced in order to show act charged was not accidental); id. at 1136 ("Rule
404(b) embodies the inclusionary conception.").
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empirical observation. Many scholars have argued, however, that the status of
the law preceding the passage of these controversial amendments was an
adequate response to the growing problem of violence and still retained the
delicate balance of protecting accused's constitutional rights.177
These special rules were designed to address a very specific area of violent
crime. It may simply be too early to determine whether the rules have
adequately responded to the dire problem they were intended to address. It
may also be premature to determine whether their application would
compromise the constitutional rights of defendants upon which the Bill of
Rights is premised.
177Karp, supra note 8; see e.g., generally Duane, supra note 9; A Small Contribution, supra
note 129, at 1125; Undertaking the Task, supra note 88, at 288.
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